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RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATOR TO MAKE TRANSPERS.
Under the system in Bngland by
* which the goods of a decedent were
administered in virtue of letters of
probate or ofadministration granted
by the ordinary, or by way of
special prerogative from the metro-
politan of the province, as the ex-
istence of bona notabilia in one or
more jurisdictions made necessary
(2 1l. CoM., 508, 509), little diffi-
culty arose concerning the locality
of personal property, such as house-
hold goods and movable chattels.
But where the property consisted
of choses in action, 'numerous dis-
putes between the ordinaries made
it necessaryto establish for them
some distinct sius: Att.-Gen. v.
Bonwens, 4 M.- & W., 171, 191.
Specialty debts were iccordingly
held to belong to the jurisdiction
where the specialties were found:
Att.-Gen. v. Bouwens, 4 M. & W.,
171, 191, Coin. Dig. Administrator
(B. 4), and simple contract debts
where the debtor resided: Com.
Dig. Adm. (B. 4), Yeomans v.
Bradshaw, Carth., 373; 3 Salk., 70;
Pipon v. Pipon, Anab., 26.
Considering the question, how-
ever, as between State and State,
instead of between different, ordin-
aries jurisdictions, since no country
can give its laws any extra-terri-
torial force, it is easy to perceive
the logic of reasoning that, debtors
can only be compelled to liquidate
their debts in the country where the
debtormay be found and the author-
ity of the personal representative is
also recognized: Story's Conft. of
Laws, 512.
On the same principle and in
the same light specialty debts are
not recognized by the law of Eng-
land as always assets wherever
found, but the s'us of such debts
at any particular time likewise de-
pends on the ability of the admii-
istrator at such time to sue -the
debtor within his jurisdiction:
Wharton's Confi. of Laws, 1 615;
I Reported in 17 S. W. Rep., xo5o. Decided November 13, x89r.
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Huthwaite v. Phaire, i M. & G.,
I$9. The early case of -Daniel v.
Luker (1571) Dyer, 305, is not in-
cojnsistent with such a view. The
defendant, a native of Ireland, in a
suitin England by an English ad-
ministrator, on a bond which had
never been out of England, pleaded
a release by the Irish administrator.
While the decision presumptiyely
went on the ground that, the bond
was an asset where it was found, yet
the case can also be broughtwithin
the principle that the situs of the
debt is that of .the debtor. In
Whyte v. Rose (1842), 3 Q. B., 493,
an action was brought in England
by the English administrator of an
intestate dying in Ireland on a
deed which was in Ireland at the
time. of his death, and it was con-
tended that an Irish administrator
alone could sue, but the Court of
Queen's Bench, speaking through
TINDALL, C. J., held the English
grant of administration to be suffi-
cient. Mr. FOOTE .(Foote's Int.
Jus., 2d ed., 279), having stated-the
facts of these two cases, says: " It
is difficult -to regard the situs of
such a bond as the' real locality of
the assets represented by it, in pref-
erence to* the country where the
debtormust be sued.". "A contract
in one place makes a man a debtor
in every place." .Peacock v. Bell,
i Win. Saund. 73.
While as between the ordinaries
in England specialty debts were
given the chattel-like quality of
being assets wherever found, the
rule did not extend to the case of
bills of exchange and promissory
notes. In Yeomans v. Bradshaw
(1728), Carth., 373; 3 Salk., 70,
the point was directly in issue.
The administratrix of a deceased
payee of ha bill of exchange
brought an action in London
against, the drawer, by virtue of
letters granted under the autliority
of the Bishop of Durham. Upon
demurrer it was. argued that, as
trover would lie for the conversion
,f such a bill it must therffore be
"goodsand chattels" andalould be
considered bona notablia wherever
found, but Lord HOLT said, it
was no more than a simple con-
tract, which followed the debtor,
and likened it. unto an award in
writing. (Cited with approval by
Baron PARKE in Mondel v. Steele,
i Dowl. Rep. (N. S.) 155; also'in.:'
Wyman v. Hglstead, lo9 U. S., 656;
Reynolds v. McMullen, 55 Mich.
568. See also Ingraham's Went.
Exrs.. 96; Atty.-Gen. v. Bouwens
(1838) 4M. &W., 171, 191; Rand v.
Hubbard, 4 Met., 252).
On an information for, probate
duty, it appeared that, a resident of'
Indiahaving directed certain secur-
ities to be realjzed and the proceeds
transmitted, to his bankers in Eng-
land, died while the proceeds of the
sale, consisting of bills of exchange
payable in six months after sight,
drawn by a bank in India on a bank
in London in favor of his bankers,
were on their way to England. The
bills having been duly honored
and the money received by the de-
fendant, the question was, whether
the amount of the bills was subject
to the duty. KELLIZ, C. B., in de-
livering his opinion, after stating
that, he considered bills ofexchange
of the nature of personal chattels;
because trover could be maintained
for them, said, "secondly, on the
ground which has -been chiefly ad-
verted to by my learned brothers, I
am clear that the bills, or rather the
money, property, or debt repre-
sented by them are liable for pro-
bate duty, namely, on the ground
that where assets consist of debts,
879.
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they are assets where the debtor re-
sides. There may, at first sight,
seem to be some difficulty in apply-
ing this principle to the case, be-
cause at the time of probate no debt
was due from any one. The drawer
wouldonlybe undera liability in the
event of the bill being dishonored,
the drawee was under no liability;
because he had not yet accepted the
bill; there was therefore no actual
debtor in existence. We are, there-
fore, driven to see who in fact be-
came the debtor and provided and
paid the money. Now the bills
were presented for acceptance in
due time; they were accepted and
paid at maturity, the only persons,
therefore, whoever became debtors
were the acceptors. They were
residents of London, and the money
came to hand in London; the assets
were therefore in London." Am-
PLETr, B., remarked: "Here the
assets are represented by bills of
exchange, which were then on their
passage from India to England, but
when the nature of a bill of ex-
change is considered, it will appear
that they represent, but do not con-
stitute the assets. The testator had
ordered his agent to pay money to
a bank in London. If this order
had not been complied with, the
testator would have had recourse to
the drawer. But if it was complied
with, and if either money or credit,
which is represented by the bills of
exchange was in London, then the
assets were in London. If it had
been otherwise, then the assets
would have been in India:" Att.-
Gen. z'. Pratt (1872), L. R., 9 Ex.,
140.
In the earlier case of Att.- Gen.
v. Bouwens (1838), 4 M. & XV., 171,
192, a bill of exchange payable out
of England was considered an in-
strument of chattel nature capable
of being transferred in England by
the English administrator. The
authority on which Lord ABINGER
supports his opinion(PARKE,doubt-
less concurred), appears to be 517
of Story's "Conflict of Laws." (See
Westlake's Priv. Int. Law, 88.)
Adopting also 516 to more clearly
express the idea, it is there written:
"If a foreign administrator has, in
virtue of his administration, re-
duced the personal property of the
deceased, there situated, into his
own possession, so that he has ac-
qftired the legal title thereto ac-
cording to the laws of that country,
if that property should afterwards
be found in another country, or be
carried away or converted there
against his will, he may maintain
suit for it there in his own name
and right personally, without tak-
ing out new letters of administra-
lion; for he is, to all intents and
purposes, the legal owner thereof,
although he is so in the character
of trustee for other persons. The
plain reason of such case is, that
the executor has, in his own right,
become full and perfect owner of
the property by the local law: and
a title to personal property duly
acquired by the lex loci rei sita,
will be deemed valid and will be
respected as a lawful and perfect
title in every other country. The
like principle will apply where
an executor or administrator, in
virtue of an administration abroad,
becomes there possessed of nego-
tiable notes belonging to the de-
ceased which are payable to bearer;
for then he becomes the legal owner
and bearer by virtue of his admin-
istration and may sue thereon in
hisown name; and he need not take
out letters of administration in the
State where the debtor resides, in
order to maintain suit against him.
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And for a like reason it would seem
that negotiable paper of the de-
ceased payable to order, actually
held and endorsed by a foreign ex-
ecutor or administrator in the for-
eign country, who is capable there
of passing the legal title by such
endorsement, would confer a com-
plete legal title on the endorsee, so
that he ought to be treated in every
other country as the legal endorsee,
and allowed to sue thereon accord-
ingly in the same manner that he
would be if it were a transfer of
any personal goods or merchandise
of the deceased, situated in such for-
eign country."
"The maxim of the law of the
civilized world is, "mobilia sequen_
hmrpersonam," and is founded on
the nature of things. When mo-
bilia are in places other than that
of the person to whom they belong,
their accidental situs is disregarded,
and they are held to go along with
the person." (Lord SELBOURNE in
Freke v. Lord Carbery, L. R., i6
Eq., 466; Foote's Int. Jus., 2d ed.,
224; Story's Confl. of Laws, P 380.)
But, in the words of Judge BUTLER
(Carmichael v. Ray, i Rich. II6),
"it is a mistake to suppose that,
upon his death, his legal represent-
atives, appointed under the laws of
his domicile, are invested with like
title and power as to all such pro-
perty; while the owner when alive
is, clothed with this authority, yet
his death is an event which changes
the character of the title, and in-
vests new parties with power over
his estate:" Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
573.
No nation is under any obliga-
tion to enforce foreign laws to the
prejudice of the rights of its sub-
jects. It has been well said "the
duty of every government is to pro -
tect its own citizens, and especially
the rights of creditors as the
material and commercial prosperity
of a country depends greatly on
this protection and security. If a
government fails in this, it fails in
one of its most impoftant functions.
and duties. To this end, therefore,
it is well understood that the dif-
ferent governments in which the
movable property of a deceased
may be left, upon his death, are
authorized to intervene and take
control. Hence, in every State,
we find laws declaring in whom
such property, within its limits,
shall vest, and in what manner it
shall be administered: " SIMPSON,
C. J., in Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
573. The title of an executor or
administrator, derived from a grant
of administration, cannot de jure,
as a matter of right, extend beyond
the territory of the government
which grants it. The title acknowl-
edged in another is acknowledged
from comity. Reason is against
extending the comity. "It would
be a'great hardship upon the
creditors of a decedent in any
country to allow a foreign ad-
ministrator to withdraw the assets
of his estate without the payment
of their claims, and leave there to
seek their remedy in a foreign
jurisdiction, and, perhaps, then to
meet, with obstructions and in-
equalities in the enforcement of
their rights from the peculiarities
of the local law:" Story's Confl. of
Laws, 512. This policy grows
more important with the possibility
of the decedent being insolvent,
because the lex fort determines
the priority of claims: Story's Confl.
of Laws, a 524 and 525; Wharton's
Confl. of Laws, 622. Agreeably
to these considerations it has been
the general rule that, neither an
executor or administrator may
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maintain a suit in a foreign coun-
try, unless he has obtained a new
grant of administration, or has
qualified as required by the local
laws: Story's Confl. of Laws, 512.
Where the 'property is "mov-
able, tangible property, such as
horses, cattle, wares and merchan-
dise, the foreign administrator can-
not sue for their recovery from
want of title. The same want of
- title prevents any recognition of
his transferee:" Dial v. Gary, 14 S.
C., 573.
But it-has been said that "an
,assignment by an administrator of
a chose in action in the State
where he is appointed, and which
is good by its laws, will enable the
assignee to sue in his own name in
any other State, by whose laws the
instrument would be assignable, so
'as to pass title to the assignee, and
enablex him to sue thereon:"
Story's Confl. of -Laws, 359.
Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 16
(opinion by Story), was cited as
being founded on this doctrine, al-
though it is no authority for such a
proposition. There are cases, how-
ever, in the United States which do
maintain such a rule. In Wil-
kins v. Fllet (1882), io8 U. S., 256,
Mr. Justice GRAY said: "The ad-
ministrator, by virtue of his ap-
pointment and authority as such,
obtains the title to promissory
notes and other written evidences
of debt, held by the intestate at
the time olhis death, and coming to
the possession of the administrator,
and may selltransfer and endorse
the same; and the purchasers may
maintain actions in their own
names against the debtors in an-
other State, if the notes are negoti-
able promissory notes, or if by the
law of the State, the assignee of a
chose in action may sue in his own
name." This was but a re-state-
ment of the law, established in the
same court in Harper v. Butler
(1829), 2 Pet., 239. An executor
assigned a note which was payable
to the deceased absolutely, without
any negotiable words. It was de-
cided that the debtor might be sued
in another State, if, by the law
where the assignment was made,
the legal title passed, and by the
law of the forum, the assignee
could sue in his own name.
This was the first case in which
such a doctrine was promulgated.
No counsel appeared for the defen-
dant, no authorities were cited by
counsel or the court, and the
opinion is very meagre. Andrews
v. Carr (1853), 26 Miss., 579, and
Owen v. Moody (1855), 29 Miss.,
79, follow the same principle upon
a like form of contract, but the
former is as unsatisfactory as Har-
per v. Butler.
Leake v. Gilchist (1829), 2 Dev.
kN. C.), 73, went broadly on the
ground that debts due by specialty
are assets for administration wher-
ever the specialty is found. In ad-
mitting the right of the assignee of
a foreign administrator to sue, it
was remarked that, the evil of per-
mitting a withdrawal of the assets
out of the State to the inconvenien ce
of creditors, could only arise in
this class of debts, and could not
be alarming; because they formed
usually but a small portion of the
assets of an estate. Grace v. Han-
nah (1858), 6 Jones' Law, 94, and
Smith v. Tiffany, 16 Hun., 552, are
parallel decisions.
A chose in action, by its very
name, signifies a thing or property
of which the owner has not the
possession, but merely a right of
action for its possession: 2 BI.
Com., 389; Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
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573. The idea contains two ele-
ments, the property itself and the
right to obtain possession of the
property. An instrument which
shows the title'in the owner, is but
a representative or shadow. This
evidence of the property may be
in one jurisdiction; the property in
another: Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
573-
The English law, as between
country and country, recognizes
the distinction: Whyte v. Rose
(1842), 3 Q. B., 493; Wharton's
Confl. of Laws, 615; Foote's Int.
Jus., 2d ed., 279. An American
case also accords with this view.
The question was, whether the
plaintiff, a holder of a bond, pur-
chased by him from a foreign
domicilliary administrator, had the
legal right to sue the debtor in
South Carolina: "S I MPsoN, C. J.,
in delivering the opinion of the
Court, said: The chose or thing is
situated in South Carolina, and the
evidence of right to sue, at the
death of the intestate, was in Mas-
sachusetts, but that right could not
have been exercised in that State
even by the owner of the bond him-
self, at leht, so long as the debtor
continued in South Carolina, and
according to strict law, ought to be
subject to administration in South
Carolina: Dial v. Gary (i88o), 14
S. C., 573.
In Peterson v. The Chemical
Bank (1865), 32 N. Y., 21, the
point was as to the right of a
foreign executor to assign a debt,
due by the defendant bank to his
testator, and evidenced by a bank
book. The contract was so drawn
as to indemnify the assignee of the
fund for any expenses incurred in
its collection, the design being to
avoid the founding of an adminis-
tion in the State where the bank
rNUE.s 883
was situated. DnNio, C. J., lfho
delivered the opinion, considered
the disibility of the foreign executor
to sue, as attaching to his person
and not to the subject matter of the
action, and sustained the suit.
The effect of the instrument de-
pends on the attitude of the sover-
eignty in which the property is
situated. Because an instrument is
negotiable in both the:country of
the contract and the country of the
forum, and in the country of the
forum the assignee of a "lawful
man " (Pollock on Contracts, 49),
is entitled to sue in his own name,
it doesenot follow that an adminis-
trator may transfer an enforceable
title: See Yeomans v. Bradshaw,
Carth., 373; Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
573; Thompson V. Wilson, 2 N. H.,
291; McCarthy v. Hall, 13 Mo.,
480; Slocum v. Sanford, 2 Conn.,
533; SHIRWOOD, J., in Reynolds
v. McMullen, 55 Mich., 568;
Stearns v. Burnham, 5 Greenl.
(Me.), 261. To maintain such a
doctrine would "defeat the great
object of each State or government
retaining control over the property
of an absent decedent, the rights
of domestic creditors might be
wholly destroyed, and the laws
providing local administration
under local authorities for the pro-
tection of such creditors eluded
and overthrown :" SIMPSON, C. J.,
in Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C., 573; -
SHERWOOD, J., in Reynolds v. Mc-
Mvullen, 55 Mich., 568; Steams v.
Burnham, 5 Greenl. (Me.), 261.
The transferee would be given a
greater right than he from whom
title was obtained. The principle
of law that, a person by an execu-
tion of a power, may often confer
an enforceable title where he him-
self could not have sued (see Rand
v. Hubbard, 4 Met.), does not apply:
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Dial v. Gary, i4 S. C., 573. A per-
sonal representative is of an arti-
ficial status peculiar to himself,
which can neither be compared to
the status of infants, married
women, lunatics, corporations or
assignees in bankruptcy: (As to as-
signees in bankruptcy, see Goodwin
v. Jones, 3 Mass., 517.) No distinc-
tion between executors and admin-
istrators can be made. That fanci-
ful idea must be fully adlswered by
the inability of a government to
give its grant of letters testament-
ary any extra-territorial effect:
Story's Confl. of Laws, ? 512.
'These considerations would ex-
clude all contracts of an adminis-
trator for the transfer of assets of
the estate not reduced to possession
'and in a foreign jurisdiction. Nor
do the decisions limit the extent of
their application. But due regard
'to the peculiar character inter-
nationally conceded to promissory
notes and bills of exchange 3ay-
able to order or bearer, makes an
examination of their practical oper-
ation desirable. According to the
Lex Mercatoria adopted by Eng-
land, "the absolute benefit of the
contract is attached to the ownership
of such instruments, which accord-
ing to the ordinary rules would be
only evidence of the contract.
The proof of ownership is then
facilitated by prescribing a mode
of transfer which makes the instru-
ment itself an authentic record of
the successive transfers. Finally,
this proof is dispensed with by pre-
suming the bona fide possessor ot
the instrument to be the true own-
er" (Pollock on Contracts, 17).
The English case cited by Story
in 517 of "Conflict of Laws," to
support his theory of a personal
representative being capable of
giving an assignee of such instru-
ments an enforcible title against
a foreign debtor, is McNeilage v.
Holloway (818). I B. &. A., 218,
deciding that a husband is entitled
to sue alone on a bill of exchange
given to his wife before marriage,
an analogy being drawn between
such instruments and personal
chattels. But another and later
English case also cited, Richards
v. Richards (1831), 2 B. & Ad., 447,
does not maintain the chattel-like
quality. The American authori-
ties relied on by Story are Robin-
son v. Crandell" (1832), 9 Wend.,
425, and Barrett v. Barrett (1832),
Greenl. (Me.), 353. In Barrett v.
Barrett an administrator in New
Hampshire sued in his own name
on a note drawn in favor of his
intestate and endorsed by him in
blank. The jury found substan-
tially, the suit to have been
brought for the benefit of the
estate. But the Court considered
the question as one for the applica-
tion of the ordinary rules govern-
ing such notes, and the circum-
stance of the plaintiff really being
a trustee, a fact which could not
affect the liability of the defendant.
And it was said, if any matter of
off-set existed against the estate it
might be availed of in defence of
the action, on the theory that the
plaintiff took with notice of such
equities.
In the New York case of Robin-
son v. Crandell, decided in the
same year, SUTHERLAND, J., said:
"The notes being payable to bearer
and the payee having died in Penn-
sylvania, admitting the plaintiffs
to have been his administrators
there, and in that manner to have
obtained possession of the notes, I
see no legal objection to their main-
taining an action upon them in
their own names as bearers. As
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administrators they could not sue
here. Letters testamentary or of
administration granted abroad give
no authority to sue here; we take
no notice of them. " But being the
real owners of the note they had a
right to declare as bearers and re-
cover in that character. A mere
agent having a note of his princi-
pal, payable to bearer, may sue on
it in his own name, and it does
not lie with the defendant to object
to the plaintiff's want of interest."
The benefit of the exception of
promissory notes overcoming the
rule that on a decedent's death
debts acquire the situs of the debtor,
together with the policy which such
a rule embodies seems, therefore
to be reasoned on the doctrine that
in a suit on a note payable to bearer,
suing for the advantage of another
does not alter the principle of
liability.
Before discussing whether any
other than Story's idea is practic-
able, the other cases bearing on the
question in the United States will
be considered.
Robinson v. Crandell and Story's
. 517, "Conflict of Laws," as ap-
plied to notes and bills payable to
bearer are sustained by Knapp v.
Lee (1879), 42 Mich., 41; Sandford
v. McCreedy (1871), 28 Wis., 1O3;
Wharton's "Confl. of Iaws," ?. 615.
In Campbell v. Brown (1884), 64
Iowa, 425, the endorsement was
from the executor to a third per-
son, who was legatee of the notes
under a will. And Giddings v.
Green (I88o), 4 Hughes, C. Ct., 446,
permitted foreign executors to sue
as such and to subject a piece of
land to the lien of purchase money.
This last case is certainly much
broader than Story's idea of the
law, and no other authority can be
found where the character of an
instrument which was the property
of the decedent altered the dis-
ability of the foreign administrator
to sue: See ?, 512, Story's "Conft.
of Laws.
Where an administrator has act-
ual possession of a note or bill pa) -
able to order, Story maintains the
chattel nature of the instrument
should permit him to invest his
transferee with an absolute title:
Confl. of Laws, ?. 517; see also
Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Met., 14; Good-
ett v. Anderson (i88I), 7 'Lea
(Tenn.), 286; St. John v. Hodges,
9 Bar. (Tenn.), 334.
Thompson v. Wilson (1820), 2
N. H., 291, recognized and applied
the opposite rule. Debts due on
simple contract were said to be
bona notabilia where the debtor
lived, and consequently the foreign
executor had no interest to assign.
The same idea was more clearly
expressed in Stearns v. Burnham,
5 Greenl. (Me.), 261: "The power
of this executrix, by law, is to ad-
minister all the goods, chattels,
rights and credits which are within
Massachusetts. Debts due to the
testator, at the time of his death,
from persons residing in other
States, are placed by law on the
same grounds as goods and chattels
belonging to him and being in an-
other State. Once there she, as
executrix, deriving her authority
under the laws of Massachusetts,
has no control. We are then led
to inquire how an executor or ad-
ministrator, acting under the au-
thority derived from another State,
can, by indorsing a note due from
one of our citizens, give to his en-
dorsee a power which he himself
does not possess; that is, of success-
fully suing and recovering in our
courts. If this can be done it will
be an indirect mode of giving op-
885 .
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eration,.in this State, to the laws of
Massachusetts, as such: or in other
words, authority derived directly
from her laws, which are not in
force in this State. By adopting
such a principle, the effects or
credits of a testator or intestate
found in this State might be with-
drawn, which may be necessary for
satisfying debts due from such tes-
tator or intestate to citizens of this
State."
In McCarthy v. Hall, (i85o) 13
Mo., 48o, RV1,AND, J., added,"Were
our courts to permit the executors
or administrators of a foreign State
to sue or maintain actions on notes
and bonds due to their testators or
intestates by the citizens of our
State,'or to permit their assignees
to sue, all the effects, goods and
chattels, of such testators or intes-
tAtes might thereby easily be with-
drawfi from our jurisdiction to the
prejudice and injury of our citizens.
•. Such is never suffered orpermitted.
It i s our duty to guard the interest
of our own citizens, to look well to
our own household first. Nostrum
jus, magis quam jus alienum, ser-
vemus.1"
So in Connecticut, where suit
was brought by an administrator on
a note payable to the intestate or
order, a payment to the ancillary
administrator at the domicile of the
debtor was held a discharge as
against a subsequent suit by the
principal administrator who held
the note: Slocum v. Sandford, 2
Conn., 534. See also the opinion
of SHERWOOD, T., in Reynolds v.
- McMullen, 55 Mich., 568.
Gove v. Gove, 64 N. H., 503, how-
ever overruled the principles stated
in Thompson v.Wilson, 2 N. H., 291,
and Barrett v. Barrett, 8 Greenl. 346,
makes no mention of Stearns v.
Burnham, 5 Greenl., 26r, although
upon an almost similar point.
Riddick v.'Moore (1871), 65 N.
C., 382, presents a phase of this
question. The administrator in
Virginia sent a note to an agent in
North Carolina, who there assigned
it to the plaintiff. PEARSON, C. J.,
in delivering the opinion of the
Court, said: "While the .note could
not be sued on by the Virginia ad-
ministrator, yet for all matters in
fiais he had a right to send it to
North Carolina for sale and assign-
ment. In deducing title the letters
of administration granted in Vir-
ginia and the assignment though
made in North Carolina bad the
same legal effect as a bill of sale
for a horse, executed in North Caro-
lina, had he sent the horse to North
Carolina and sold it as he did the
note." Lucas v. Bryne (1871), 35
Md., 485, only differed from this last
case in that the administrator in
his fiduciary character transferred
the note to himself in his personal
character in the State where suit
was brought.
It is difficult to sustain the
correctness of the contract prin-
ciples involved in the last two
cases. The power of an adminis-
trator is confined to the jurisdiction
of his appointment, and, therefore,
his contracts in a foreign State as
administrator must lack that qual-
ity, since it is impossible to com-
pletely dispose of the contract
necessary to transfer the instrument,
in the chattel quality of the instru-
ment. In both these cases the
contract was made in a State foreign
to the qualification. In the latter,
the jurisdiction of the contract is
express. In the former, although
the agency would be governed by
Virginia law, the contract of the
principal through the agent would
be regulated by the law of North
Carolina.
In Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Met., 252,
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several questions were suggested as
making the siUs of the debt that
of the debtor impossible of applica-
.tion to bills of exchange and pro-
missory notes. It was asked: If
an endorsement can only be made
by an executor or administrator
appointed and authorized in the
State where the debtor dwells, what
is an endorsee to do who holds a
note with a promissor and several
endorsers living in different States?
Must it be endorsed by one ad-
ministrator so as to give a right of
action against the promissor, and
by another administrator so as to
give a right of action against each
endorser?
The title of an administrator
who has a right of action to a fund
is certainly stronger than the title
of one 'who has no such right.
When the fund is received by the
administrator from the sale of the
note it becomes an asset of the
estate in his jurisdiction. If on
failure of payment by the promissor
the transferee should sue the ad-
ministrator on his contract of en-
dorsement, the position of the ad-
ministrator would be the same as if
the other rule were to be applied.
The liability of the other endorsees
to the holder of the note should be
no less; for the administrator,
should they alone be sued, still
holds the fund obtained from the
sale of the note as an asset to be
used in the satisfaction of debts or
the payment of legacies.
Where a note is payable to order
a prospective purchaser would be
charged with notice of its being an
asset of the estate, since the right
to receive payment would appear
in the decedent and the endorse-
ment be made by another person.
But if the note was payable to
bearer, it is clearly possible for a
holder to be entirely without notice
of the personal representative being
in the chain of title, and against
such a holder that circumstance
could not defeat a recovery.
In bills of exchange another con-
tingency is developed. The bill
may not have been presented. Un-
til acceptance, therefore, it would
be impossible to relegate the situs
of the note to either the jurisdiction
of the drawee or the drawer. The
drawee would be protected in ac-
cepting and paying the bill to an ad-
ministrator appointed in his juris-
diction, and there is no reason to
suppose that the same rule would
not apply, were paymenttobe made
to his endorsee: Att.- Gen. v. Pratt,
L. R., 9 Ex., 140.
According to Yeomans v. Brad-
shaw, Carth., 373, however, present-
ment does not have to be made by
the administrator deriving his ap-
pointment from the country of the
drawee. And by the same case
suit could only be brought against
the drawer by the administrator
recognized in his jurisdiction.
The drawee of a bill held by a
foreign administrator or his trans-
feree, to protect himself should,
therefore, always decline to accept
the draft, unless the rule obtains
within the country where such pre-
sentment is made that, a voluntary
payment to such an administrator
is a good discharge in the absence
of local administration.
While a doctrine of notice as
applied to this question is not
known to have been announced by
any authority, it seems a not im-
practicable solution. That there
must be something wrong with the
chattel idea of Story is readily dis-
cernible when the effect of a col-
lateral security is considered.
Bonds of governments, bonds and
RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATOR
stocks of corporations and real se-
curities are often given as collat-
eral security for the principal debt
Where the bonds of a government
pass freely from hand to hand with-
out any additional transfer in the
country from which they have been
issued, they are practically money,
and had Att'y-Gen. v. Bouwens, 4
.M. & W., 171, not compared such
instruments to foreign bills of ex-
change, there seems little doubt
that Westlake (Westlake's Priv.
Int. Law, J 88), would not have
considered 517 Story's "Conft. of
Laws," to be the law of England.
(Foote does not, however, seem to
entertain this view. See Foote's
Int Jus., 2d ed., 282.) Should the
\additional transfer be necessary the
stus of the asset is deemed to be
the sius of the debtor. Atty.-Gen.
v. Dimond, I C. & J., 356; Att.-
Gen. i). Hope, C., M. & R., 530; 8
Bligh, 144"
New York conforming to the
principle subsequently expressed in
Peterson v. The Chemical Bank, 32
N.Y., 21, took the opposite view
of the stock of a corporation: Mid-
dlebrook v. Merchants' Bank, 27
How. Pr., 474. Throughout the
United States the bonds of the
United States Government have no
particular situs, Vaughan v. Nor-
thup, 15 Peters, i; Shakespeare v.
Fidelity Ins.-Co., 97 Pa. St.. 173.
The nature of mortgages depends
on the law of the State where the
land is situated. SroR says ( 424
Conft. of Laws): "The general
principle of the common law is,
that the laws of the place where
immovable property is situated, ex-
clusively govern in respect to the
rights of the parties, the modes of
transfer and the solemnities which
should accompany them. The title,
therefore, to real property can be
acquired, passed and lost only' ac-
cording to the lex rei sita.
In Cutler v. Davenport, i Pick.
(Mass.), 8I, the question was as to
the effect of an assignment of a
bond and mortgage by a foreign ad-,
ministrator, and it was decided that,
although for certain purposes the
transfer might be considered as an
assignment of a chose in action,
with'collateral security for its pay-
ment, yet as the land might event-
ually be held as an absolute estate
under the mortgage, should it be
foieclosed, the conveyance was ne-
cessarily sufficient to transfer the
land. And that in the transfer of
land which is governed by the lex
sit-, the foreign administrator
would not be recognized. (See also
Reynolds v. McMullen, 55 Mich.,
- 568,.where the same principles were
applied, the question being simi-
lar, except that statute law distin-
guished between foreign personal
representatives and those in Michi-
gan although not upon the express
case.)
New Hampshire and New York
have considered mortgages mere
personalty capable of transfer -by a
foreign administrator, and the
Texas case forming the subject of
the annotation takes the same posi-
tion with regard to the deed of
trust. Gove v. Gove (1886), 64 N.
H., 503; Smith v. Tiffany (1879), x6
Hun. 552, and Solinsky v. Fourth
Nat. Bk., 17 S. W. Rep., io5o.
In Doolittle v. Lewis (1823) 7
John's Ch., 45, an administrator in
Vermont held a bond secured by a
mortgage on lands in New York.
The mortgage contained a power to
the mortgagee, his executors, ad-
ministrators and assigns in case of
default in payment, to sell and con-
vey the premises according to the
laws of that State. Chancellor
TO MAKE TRANSFERS.
KtNT held this clause to be a spe-
cial power given by the mortgagor,
not derived from any court in an-
other State, and authorized its exe-
cution in New York by a personal
representative of the mortgagee ap-
pointed in Vermont, where the
mortgagee died, saying, the power
and the execution of the power
were a matter of private contract
between the parties and not of juris-
diction. (See also Averill v. Tay-
lor, 5 How. Pr., 476, and Hayes v.
Frey (1882), 54 Wis. 503, where this
doctrine was adopted.)
Where the instrument represent-
ing the principal debt may be trans-
ferred but the collateral security is
incapable of transfer except by a
local administrator, a curious ques-
tion arises as to what right the
transferee has to enforce the prin-
cipal security. Surely this fact
should not overthrow the theory on
which the contract of a foreign ad-
ministrator is permitted to invest
his assignee with an enforceable
title to a negotiable security. Nor
should it be capable of the same in-
fluence on the chattel idea an-
nounced by STORY in 517 Conflict
of Laws. It is significant that the
cases in which the promissory note
had no collateral security were all
founded on the chattel doctrine.
But in those in which a mortgage
existed to secure the debt, the con-
tract rule was adopted. Campbell
v. Brown (1884), 64 Iowa,425; Gove
v. Gove, 64 N. H., 5o3. In Cutter
v. Davenport, I Pick., 8r, the ques-
tion was before the Court and was
suggested by counsel, but the opin-
ion merely decided against permit-
ting a foreign administrator to
transfer a mortgage on land in
Massachusetts, without noticing
the effect of their action on the
principal obligation which the
57
mortgage was given to secure. The
contingency seems to have im-
pressed the Supreme Coiurt of South
Carolina in Dial v. Gary, r4 S. C.
573, for in the face of a tendency
on all sides to follow STORY, the
nature of a bond was considered
and an opposite view taken.
In Reynolds v. McMullen, $5
Mich, 568, the tactics of the CoUrt
in Cutter v. Davenport were pur-
sued by all but SHaERWOOD, J., who
attacked the chattel character of a
promissory note as the Court in
South Carolina did the bond. The
question was as to the right of the
administrator of a decedent in
Missouri to assign a note with a
mortgage on land in Michigan,
where the debtor resided, given to
secure it. He said: -The real
question in this case, upon the facts
appearing upon this record, is this:
Were the debts, owing by persons
residing in this State to the de-
ceased, assets to be administered
by the Court in Missouri, or by the
Court in lMichigan? "By the com-
mon law debts due by specialty are
esteemed to be the goods of the
deceased where the securities are
at the time of his death; but debts
due by simple contract follow the
person of the debtor, and are regar-
ded as the goods of the deceased
where the debtor resides at the time
of the creditor's death: 3 Bac. Abr.
(Wils. ed. (37-8; Toller's Law of
Executors, 55; "Wms. Saund., 274,
note 3; Speed v. Kelley, 2 Am. Rep.,
553; Wyman v. U. S., 29 Alb. Law
J., 194; Slocum v. Sanford, 2 Conn.,
534- "I am unable to see any good
reason for the distinction made
between debts by specialty and by
simple contracts, or why they
should not all be deemed assets to
be administered at the same place.
The proceeds after the payment of
889.
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debts have all to be distributed ac-
cording to the law at the domicile
of the deceased; but such is the
law as we find it, and a change'is
for the legislature, and cannot prop-
erly be made by this Court. There
can be no question but that the
note was a simple contract debt
and subject to the law applicable
to that kind of claims: Slocum v.
Sanford, sufir; 2 Cooley's BI.
CoM., 51o." "This Court has
already decided that the debts in
this State due to a person resident
in another State, dying there, can
only be enforced by an executor
or administrator duly appointed
here: Vickery v. Beir, 36 Mich.,
50; Thayer v. Lane, Walk. Ch.,
2oo; and such is the rule at com-
mon law: Story's Confl. Law, O
513, 5t4 and cases cited. The
assignee of these claims, due
from the debtor's in this State,
stands in no other or better posi-
tion than did the public adminis-
trator who made the assignment to
him, aid could confer no rights
which he did not possess: Chapman
v. Fish, 6 Hill, 554; Thompson v.
Wilson, 2 N. H., 29r, and pay-
ment to him is no defence to this
suit: Dissoway v. Carroll, 4 Lans.,
19; Vaughn v. Barrett, 5 Vt., 333;
Pond v. Makepeace, 2 Met., 114;
Riley v. Riley, 3 Day, 74; Glenn v.
Smith, 2 Gill & J., 493; McLean v.
Meek, 18 How., 16. The proper
place for administering such assets
must necessarily be where alone
payment can be enforced against
the debtor. I can cometo noother
conclusion upon the facts appear-
ing upon this record. "It neces-
sarily follows that the note and
mortgage were assets to be ad-
ministered in this State, and that
the public administrator in St.
Louis acquired no right to sell or
dispose of the same in that State
to any person, or any right to the
possession or control of the note
and mortgage, further than to
safely keep them and deliver the
same to the administrator here
required, until after the estate in
Michigan was settled and the debts
there were paid: 2 Kent's Com.,
433, 434; 2 B1. Com., 509; Bac. Abr.
'Executor' R.; Byron v. Byron,
Cro. Eliz., 472; Hilliard v. Cox.,
Ld. Raym, 562; Salk., 37; Whart.
Confl. Laws, 6o4.
* "There is no doubt but that an
executor or administrator may law-
fully sell the personal estate of the
deceased, unless prohibited at pub-
lic or private sale without the order
of the judge of probate, within the
jurisdiction of the Court where
such property is assets in his hands
for administration. He may do so
even at a discount, though the
property sold be notes and mort-
gages: Burt v. Ricker, 6 Allen, 77;
3 Redf. Wills, 226, 229; 236; and the
purchaser will take a good title
thereto, provided the property was
assets within the control and juris-
diction of the Court where admin-
istration was granted. He cannot
make such sale, however, when he
has not the right to enforce collec-
tion: Yeomans v. 11radshaw, Carth.,
373; Tourton v. Flower, 3 P. Wins.,
369; Isham v. Gibbons, i Bradf.
Sur., 69; Story on Confl. Laws, a
512, 513, 514, 515 a , 522, 523; Mc-
Carthy v. Hall, 13 MO., 480; Chap-
man v. Fish, suf-a; Goodwin v.
Jones, 3 Mass., 514; Riley v. Riley;
sufira; SteArns v. Burnham, 5
Greenl., 261; Harrison v. Sterry, 5
Cranch, 289; Dawes v. Head, 3
Pick., 138; Harvey v. Richards, i
Mass., 423; Glenn v. Smith, su,&ra;
89o
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Vaughn v. Barret, suzfra;.Lee v.
Havens, Brayt., 93; Thompson v.
Wilson, 2 N. H., 291; Judy v.
Kelley, II Ill., 211; Willard v.
Hammond, 21 N. H., 382; Smith v.
Guild, 34 Me., 443; Langdon v.
Potter, Ii Mass., 313; Rorer Inter-
state Law, 248; Speed v. Kelly, 59
Miss., 47; Owen v. Miller, io Ohio
St., r43; Abbott v. Coburn, 28 Vt.,
663; Vaughan v. Northrup, 15 Pet.,
1; Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall, 394;
Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y., 577;
Valle v. Fleming, 19 Mo., 454."
The greater number of direct de-
cisions must be conceded to agree
with STORY, both as to the rights of
a foreign administrator of bills and
notes, payable to order or bearer,
and to the effect of the contract to
transfer any other negotiable in-
strument Peterson v. The Chem-
ical Bank, 32 N. Y., 21, shows the
extreme the latter doctrine can be
legitimately carried to. The more
frequent chance for the use of the
former, is as dangerous, as the ex-
treme of the latter.
No case has been found where
the accident of local creditors or
local administration has been said
to alter the rule of liability. On
the contrary, in Peterson v. Chem-
ical Bank, 32 N. Y., 21, the excep-
tional feature of no local creditors
was considered as not changingthe
principle. The expresw observa-
tion in the leading case of the fact
that no domestic claimant for the
fund has been proved on the trial,
seems suggestive of suchr a circum-
stance being vital in Texas. The
adoption of such a doctrine, how-
ever, would embarrass the already
complicated condition of this
branch of the law.
Judgment against one administra-
tor is no evidence of a debt against
another, a parting reason for the
maintainance of the rule, " debts
follow the debtor," in the interna-
tional law of decedent's estates:
Talmage v. chapel, 16 Mass.; Slan-
ter v. Cherworth, 7 Ind., 211; Tay-
lor v. Barron, 35 N. H., 484; Low
v. Bartlett, 8 Allen, 259; Jones v.
Jones, r5 Tex., 463; Price v. Mace,
47 Wiss., 23; Brodie v. Bickley, 2
Rawle, 231; McLean v. Meek, 18
How., 16; McGarvey v. Darniel, 32
Ill. App., 226.
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